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Abstract: Vulnerability is an emerging notion that has contributed to refine judgments made 
by regional human rights courts and thereby increase State accountability. Similarly, recent 
developments in the vulnerability theory pose interesting challenges to the core premises 
underlying liberalism and especially the notion of legal subjectivity, an arguably inaccurate 
portrayal of the real-life individual. Moreover, the vulnerability theory suggests a promising 
intertwining with the theoretical framework underpinning human rights. In this paper, I 
advocate for a paradigm shift from the traditional legal subject to the vulnerable subject in the 
liberal human rights order. To support my case, I argue that vulnerability’s ethical-normative 
implications for the realm of human rights are twofold. First, vulnerability consists of an 
alternative conceptual underpinning for human rights theory, supplementing the so-called 
capabilities approach to human rights. Second, it can be used as a conceptual device for human 
rights adjudication by shedding light on how to better delineate the scope of State duties. I aim 
to demonstrate how vulnerability highlights the importance of ensuring the equality of 
opportunities and capabilities of individuals under the State’s jurisdiction, widening State 
responsibility to encompass social conditions which allow vulnerability to be mitigated and 
human agency to flourish. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Vulnerability is a concept that has recently gained momentum in scholarly research on ethics, 
law and human rights.1 Recent vulnerability theories are a response arising from the illusory 
myth of the invulnerable, disembodied, and de-contextualised subject of classical liberal law.2 
According to the liberal paradigm of legal subjectivity, there is a rational, free-choosing, 
autonomous, and able-bodied person who supposedly has equal standing in society in relation 
to others.3 The critique instead affirms that the liberal subject ignores the normative relevance 
of embodied vulnerability and the ensuing inequalities deriving from distinct individual 
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embodied experiences.4 As a consequence of adopting the archetypical liberal subject as norm, 
vulnerability and dependency are confined to the private sphere, away from the public sphere, 
where legitimate State interference is accepted. 5  In this context, situations of grave 
vulnerability that are tantamount to actual or imminent human rights violations are hidden by 
the veil of the private/public divide, hindering State action or justifying State inaction where 
responsiveness by the latter is necessary.6 To address this issue, the vulnerability theory is 
premised upon the acknowledgment that the reality of human embodiment entails dependence 
on the surrounding socio-material environment. 7  Moreover, it proposes accumulation of 
resilience, that is, resources such as physical, human, social, and environmental assets which 
constitute sine qua non conditions for the individual to be able to confront the implications of 
vulnerability and exercise agency. Accumulating resilience would thus consist of gradually 
remedying situations of exacerbated vulnerability. 8 I suggest herein that vulnerability is a 
concept that enables a promising twist towards a new theoretical framework. The proposed 
novelty is twofold: first, it presents a more accurate depiction of the complex reality involving 
human rights and corresponding State duties; second, it reveals the promotion of positive 
obligations and socio-economic rights. 
In this paper, I argue that vulnerability has ethical-normative implications in the 
understanding of core values underlying human rights protection in two ways. First, 
vulnerability consists of a transversal concept which provides a starting point to an enhanced 
understanding of foundational principles in human rights theory, namely freedom, autonomy 
and capabilities.9 Second, vulnerability can be used as conceptual device for human rights 
adjudication, 10  by shedding light on how to better delineate the scope of State duties. 
Intertwined with the capabilities approach to human rights, 11  vulnerability highlights the 
importance of ensuring equality of opportunities and capabilities of individuals under the 
State’s jurisdiction. These arguments lead to an understanding of State responsibility as 
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comprising the promotion of social conditions to mitigate vulnerability and allow human 
agency to flourish.12 
In this way, vulnerability as a conceptual underpinning for human rights theory, or as a 
heuristic device that assigns human rights obligations, sheds an ethical light on interpretation 
by the courts. It challenges common presuppositions and brings to light essential aspects of 
human nature that call for the reimagining of the liberal subject by embracing his bare 
vulnerability as a normatively relevant feature. In this sense, rather than only ‘fitting and 
justifying’ current practices, 13  vulnerability analysis paves the way for a welcome 
improvement to present-day human rights interpretation under the traditional liberal matrix. It 
compels us to reconsider certain liberal assumptions, namely liberal subjectivity, formal 
equality, and Cartesian watertight binaries (including public/private and 
autonomy/dependency), by underscoring how these concepts and the oppositional values 
ascribed to each side of the binaries may obscure the ascertainment of rights and duties and 
institutionally ratify pre-existing social inequities.14  
The problem surrounding the legal subject exists in the gap between this abstract 
archetype and real-life concrete individuals, whose humanity lies in their embodied 
vulnerability and dependency.15 By enclosing dependency in the private sphere, where State 
interference is not deemed legitimate, the law neglects to contemplate the most dependent and 
vulnerable subjects. This is of particular concern due to the abhorrent human rights violations 
that might occur in power relations, unravelling in the context of care, dependency and private 
relations between individuals – for example, domestic violence. To remedy this, I argue that 
the legal subject must be exposed through the lens of vulnerability: a disruptive, yet 
harmonising concept that invites a holistic approach towards human rights protection, 
eschewing the separation between the liberty-maximising autonomous individual and the 
socio-materiality upon which his embodied existence depends.16  
Mindful of this prelude, I will firstly examine the notion of vulnerability as a theoretical 
foundation for human rights. I will then analyse vulnerability’s connection to certain 
philosophical concepts, namely freedom, autonomy, and agency. 17  A section will then 
delineate the scope of the State’s ethical responsibility to address the effects of vulnerability 
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by tackling the unfair social distribution of privileges and disadvantages.18 In this paper, I shall 
focus on the central role of the State in responding to vulnerability and human rights.19 I will 
further discuss how vulnerability supplements the capabilities approach to human rights,20 the 
latter being an account of how to measure equality of rights. Finally, I will delve into the 
normative implications of adopting vulnerability as a heuristic device in the jurisprudence of 
regional human rights courts. I will contend that vulnerability sophisticates the human rights 
project insofar as it enables a context-sensitive and nuanced assessment of rights violations, 
ethically strengthening the argument in favour of justiciable socio-economic rights, positive 
obligations of the State, substantive equality, and social justice. 
 
B. CRITIQUE OF IDEALISED ASSUMPTIONS IN LIBERAL LAW 
In this section I will describe the critique posed against the liberal standpoint on legal 
subjectivity, formal equality and antidiscrimination law.21 I will further examine how adopting 
vulnerability as a conceptual pillar may have an edifying effect on human rights interpretation 
by uncovering structural patterns of oppression and societal disadvantage,22 inviting a more 
enhanced analysis of the ethical duties of the State in respecting and showing concern to 
individuals under an egalitarian ethos.23 
1. The Liberal Subject 
Firstly, vulnerability theorists claim that liberal law fails to duly account for both vulnerability 
and its normative implications, due in particular to the idealised conceptualization of the legal 
subject as essentially invulnerable. It is contended that liberal theory neglects to endow socio-
material needs with normative relevance by privatising relationships of care and ascribing them 
the status of secondary importance. 24  Moreover, it is argued that the liberal archetype is 
constructed upon the premises of liberty and autonomy, central tenets of contractarianism. 
Contractarianism posits that social relationships are built under the logic of consensual 
contractual relations whereby individuals intentionally enter into agreements of mutual rights 
and duties. 25  This model paves the way for the ascription of personal responsibility to 
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individuals for their free choices under State-ensured realms of meritocratic achievement as 
well as encircling the minimal sphere of acceptable State intervention by drawing the 
private/public divide.26 Overemphasis on individual autonomy is argued in order to hide the 
fact that free and autonomous individuals necessarily need access to social, institutional, and 
legal means to exercise their freedom. Moreover, it is emphasised that autonomy is not a given 
premise; it rather depends on an aggregate of resources to be internalised, developed and 
accumulated by individuals over time, building the necessary resilience to face adversities such 
as a lack of material resources to survive. 27  The critique continues on to assert that 
accumulation of resources and access to a dependable network of social relationships and 
institutions should not be regarded as a given premise for all, as individuals have distinct 
experiences and therefore, different degrees of accumulated resilience.28 
In sum, the critique submits that liberal law preaches formal equality as an assumption 
of the contractarian model of creating rights and duties,29 a metaphorical abstraction that is 
adopted to prop up not only the ascription of responsibilities in interpersonal relations under 
consensual, contractual and proprietary juridical regimes, but also in the relationship between 
citizens and States.30 According to this critique, the problem lies on the fact that the liberal 
paradigm ignores how subjects are unequally positioned in the intricate social fabric of power 
imbalance and unequal distribution of privilege and disadvantage.31 It argues that liberalism 
overvalues the rational free-choosing mind whilst forgetting to acknowledge how humans are 
dependent on their emotions, affective relations, and embodied needs.32 The vulnerability 
critique questions the goal of maximising liberty to the detriment of the need to reduce 
inequalities and mitigate human vulnerabilities. 33 Moreover, it emphasises how liberalism 
might entail unequal distribution of vulnerability-aggravating and resilience-fostering factors, 
thereby perpetuating cycles of marginalisation and exclusion that lead to human rights 
violations.34 The sources of these violations are pointed out to be structural biases such as the 
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harms of misrecognition and mal-distribution,35 which allegedly remain hidden in institutional 
and legal neutrality under liberalism. 
2. Dichotomies 
Secondly, the critique against liberal legal theory is targeted at the over-reliance placed upon 
dichotomous categories (for example, public/private, reason/emotion, mind/body, 
agency/dependency).36 Binary constructions are not per se pernicious to legal analysis; in fact, 
the problem lies in how theorists engage with these categories, overvaluing one end of the 
continuum to the detriment of the other, reflecting and corroborating the uneven assignment of 
privileges and disadvantages in society.37 Bearing this dual dynamic in mind, the critique 
implies that law perpetuates social inequalities by emphasising certain values whilst ignoring 
or devaluing others. With regard to the private/public divide in liberal theory, the presupposed 
independent, rational, disembodied, and unencumbered legal subject,38 who actively partakes 
in the public life of the community whilst having his private sphere immunised against State 
interference, is considered to be the norm. By contrast, the exception is concomitantly 
constituted by those whose independence and autonomy are compromised, presented as the 
vulnerable ‘other’ against which the allegedly invulnerable one is created. According to this 
reasoning, as the protection of human rights law is targeted to the latter, the former is thus 
excluded from due protection, which is especially alarming for the most vulnerable individuals. 
As a result, the critique suggests changes in human rights law, particularly to accommodate 
and cater for the needs of the excluded.39 
This critique brings to the fore the issue of equality. Challenging the private/ public 
divide and endowing it with more fluidity and permeability may thus be a starting point to 
deconstruct other forms of embedded societal disadvantage that are concealed and ratified by 
liberal Cartesian dichotomies. The autonomy/dependency binary, which is intertwined with the 
public/private divide, must also be addressed, as real individuals are concomitantly 
autonomous and dependent to varying degrees. Liberal law fosters the value of autonomy 
whilst stigmatising and privatising dependency, 40  hiding the primordial nature of human 
embedded sociality and, as a consequence, veiling human dependency on the surrounding 
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socio-materiality as a condition for resource accumulation that allows one’s autonomy to be 
enjoyed.41 It follows from overvaluing autonomy as independence and devaluing dependency 
and care, that entitlements of socio-economic rights are also perceived below the acceptability 
threshold,42 being placed at a hierarchically inferior position in relation to civil and political 
rights. In both national and international courts, the primacy of civil and political rights is 
instantiated by their unobjectionable status of justiciable rights, whilst struggles still remain to 
find consensus over the justiciability boundaries of socio-economic rights.43 
3. Formal Equality 
Particularly vulnerable subjects are the ones who are less resilient to negative externalities, ie 
they have accumulated less socio-material resources such as high levels of education, training 
for decently-paying jobs or social networks of support, having less influence in the public 
sphere and weaker protection in the private sphere. The high threshold for State intervention in 
the private sphere often allows unequal power relations to unfold in an unbridled way, leading 
to abuses and harm. In addition to unequal distribution of socio-material resources, other 
sources of vulnerability-aggravating circumstances come into play, such as insidious forms of 
discrimination on the basis of group membership (based on inter alia gender, race, poverty, 
nationality, age and religion). Antidiscrimination laws have been a welcome development in 
this regard, particularly recent efforts of positive action. Nevertheless, there is still margin to 
expand human rights protection towards including individuals who do not belong to any of the 
recognised ‘special groups’ deserving of protection, but face actual disadvantages that 
exacerbate their vulnerability to a high level of concern. Hence, more context-sensitive State 
responsiveness is required in human rights interpretation, supplementing antidiscrimination 
legal frameworks. 
Formal equality entails, as a principle of social justice, sameness of treatment by law as 
a requirement for fairness.44 In the case of differently placed individuals with respect to social 
privilege and disadvantage, formal equality may result in the indifference towards structural 
patterns of discrimination, oppression and marginalisation as well as mechanisms that 
perpetuate material inequality.45 This might aggravate the disadvantaged position of some 
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whilst contributing to sustaining the pre-existing privilege of others.46 The ill-fitting model of 
formal equality may thus exacerbate significant de facto inequalities in society under the guise 
of prima facie formal equality. As a result, the situation of extremely vulnerable individuals 
may be worsened, burdening the disadvantaged by being complicit in furthering hidden social 
and institutional mechanisms of exclusion. Thus, the application of human rights under formal 
equality may lead to scenarios of increasing vulnerability of marginalised individuals or 
groups, heightening their susceptibility to different kinds of harms, including structural patterns 
of human rights violations. 
Albeit acknowledging that antidiscrimination laws have played an extremely important 
role, it is argued that the status of special category deserving legal protection is only ascribed 
to certain groups on the basis of their identity, thus neglecting exclusionary social mechanisms 
that affect individuals based on their status.47 In this respect, a problematic issue is labelling 
individuals into fixed watertight categories,48 victimising members of protected groups and 
categorising them as deviant exceptions to an otherwise portrayed neutral and fair system, 
whilst concomitantly excluding those who are disadvantaged but do not fit any of the existing 
reified special groups meriting protection.49 In addition to that, this remedial approach is said 
to cast a shadow upon the structural allocation of disadvantage and privilege, leaving the root 
causes of the problem intact.50 
4. Rethinking Legal Subjectivity 
I concede that the above described critique seems to exaggerate by equating formal equality 
and liberal binaries to a much wider and complex range of theories that constitute the whole of 
liberalism, while neglecting for instance the different stance taken by liberal-egalitarianism.51 
Liberal-egalitarian theories are concerned with equality of material resources and fair 
distribution of individual wellbeing.52 Although the critique proposed by the vulnerability 
theory is generally addressed to liberalism, it is reasonable to suggest that it is mainly libertarian 
ideas that are confronted here. Libertarianism, similarly to classical liberalism, views the right 
to private property as of paramount value, going so far as to equate liberty and property. It 
relies on the principle that ‘each agent has a right to maximum equal empirical negative liberty’, 
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in that this liberty is set forth as absence of coercive interference from others, promoting a 
critical stance against the welfare state.53 This line of reasoning seems to bear intimate identity 
with the defence of the private/public divide and an emphasis on liberty to the detriment of 
material equality concerns. Conversely liberalism encompasses, but is not limited to, the 
narrow viewpoint of libertarianism. The vulnerability theory critique however leads towards a 
finer focus on unveiling structural disadvantages and building a more inclusive and protective 
framework for human rights protection of marginalised individuals, strengthening the case for 
experimenting with different heuristics and alternative theories. This endeavour attempts to 
complement rather than reject existing liberal-egalitarian theories, as will be further 
demonstrated. Within the boundaries of this theoretical invitation, vulnerability theorists 
propose that the concept of vulnerability might clarify the courts’ interpretation of human 
rights, and provide an alluring reassessment of the human rights project under a fairer notion 
of equality. This critique ultimately suggests the replacement of the idealised invulnerable 
subject with the vulnerable embodied subject, embracing all the ethical-normative implications 
that this concept implies. 
 
C. VULNERABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
Substantive equality may be identified with four ideas: redistribution (seeking to redress social 
disadvantages); recognition (bolstering equal dignity and worth for all); participation (in the 
decision-making spheres of the political community); and transformation (in the sense of 
abandoning an idea of equality as conformity, while fostering a society that accommodates 
human diversity).54 In addition to positive duties imposed on the State, enhancing welfare-state 
policies by setting redistribution of resources and goods illustrates State policy aimed at 
substantive equality. This also fulfils the goal of redistributive justice under an egalitarian 
mindset of reducing social inequalities.55 To address the flaws pinpointed by the vulnerability 
critique, recent efforts to build a stronger concept of equality have culminated in positive 
obligations by the State such as affirmative action schemes, in which special protection groups 
are created by law in order to rectify social disadvantages and create actual opportunities for 
the excluded and bolster equality of outcomes in society. 56  Contentions arising from the 
clashing goals set forth by incrementing positive obligations of the State against the libertarian 
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framework, imply the need for an alternative theoretical foundation that is capable of sustaining 
the move towards substantive equality. 
Based on the premise that a philosophy of human rights is pluralistic, hence 
accommodating alternative grounding theories,57 and that its ideology lies at the intersection 
of ideas and sentiments requiring a ‘distinctive ethical sensibility’,58 I advocate for a theory of 
vulnerability that sheds an ethical light upon inequality while illuminating liberal theory and 
human rights interpretation. Bearing in mind the explicit State-centric approach of this paper, 
another theoretical starting point is the Dworkinian notion of rights as aspects pertaining to the 
equal status of individuals inside a moral community, and thus demanding equal respect and 
concern by the State.59 Given these assumptions, I underscore that this undertaking does not 
intend to move away from liberalism, but is aimed at refining the latter theoretical framework 
by evaluating recent critical and socio-legal advancements on vulnerability in human rights 
theory and practice. Vulnerability reasoning brings to the fore structural mechanisms of 
inequality that are implicitly condoned by law. This approach specifically deals with social 
exclusion by virtue of structural misrecognition of certain individuals and their rights, and mal-
distribution of resources, 60  which represent hindrances to substantive equality and social 
justice.61 Thus, vulnerability strengthens the case in favour of substantive equality under the 
goal of tackling social exclusion and marginalisation, which remain hidden beneath present-
day institutions based on liberal subjectivity, formal equality and strict liberal binaries. 
1. The Vulnerable Subject 
It is imperative to draw a distinction between traditional notions of vulnerability and the 
concept of vulnerability deriving from the ‘vulnerability thesis’,62 for which I advocate herein. 
Traditional notions of vulnerability in social policy offer an over-simplistic viewpoint in their 
depiction of reality. These fit within the misleading either/or rationale that guides binary 
distinctions in law and present day antidiscrimination policies under formal equality. Under the 
traditional approach, vulnerable individuals are victimised as part of a particular disadvantaged 
group, with a high risk of suffering harm and little capacity to protect their own interests, while 
the rest of the population is portrayed as virtually invulnerable.63 Moreover, the only salient 
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connotation of vulnerability in its traditional sense is negative, associated with helplessness, 
victimhood, and passivity as well as opposed to the positive value of autonomy.64 As a result 
of this vulnerable/invulnerable categorisation, State responsiveness may unfold in dangerously 
paternalistic or coercive ways.65 
An ethics of vulnerability must necessarily transcend liberal stereotypes. Instead of 
setting vulnerable individuals as a separate category, it presents universality as embedded in 
the corporeal vulnerability shared by humanity, asserting that all human beings are vulnerable. 
According to the vulnerability theory, we are vulnerable by virtue of our embodiment, which 
leaves us susceptible to different kinds of harms. Furthermore, vulnerability underscores 
common susceptibility to pain and suffering as a compelling reason to create a social and 
institutional apparatus aimed at reducing harms in the form of systems of human rights 
protection which seek to increase collective human security.66 As States are often the primary 
source of systematic human rights abuses, they are also paradigmatic duty-holders with an 
obligation to respect and protect human rights.67 Thus, it becomes desirable to enhance State 
responsiveness to vulnerability.68 This may occur by increasing its duties and enlarging the 
scope of its human rights obligations, especially (though not solely) with respect to socio-
economic rights,69 the latter remaining in philosophical and juridical debates regarding their 
status as compared to civil and political rights.70 
The idea of replacing the liberal legal subject with the vulnerable one means 
challenging the assumption that we are a priori equally positioned and that thereby law should 
treat us as prima facie equals. This endeavour also challenges the extent to which a liberty-
maximising goal prevails over substantive equality in liberal democracies, a claim made by 
vulnerability theorists. 71  Specifically in the realm of legal analysis and human rights 
interpretation, embracing the concept of vulnerability has three relevant purposes. First, it 
fulfils a heuristic role, bringing to the fore aspects of normative relevance that remain largely 
hidden or underestimated (such as societal and institutional structures that perpetuate unequal 
patterns of privilege and disadvantage), compromising the equal fulfillment of rights and, in 
many cases, worsening pre-existing inequalities. Second, it elucidates the reexamination of 
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foundational concepts to theories of rights and social justice, namely autonomy, equality, 
capabilities, and human rights. Third, the conceptualisation of the rights-bearer as a vulnerable 
subject, results in two normative implications regarding the State’s ethical responsibility. On 
the one hand, differently situated individuals from a vulnerability standpoint entail distinct 
moral obligations by the State, as increased vulnerability might be deemed as decisive for some 
claims over others.72 On the other hand, the overall scope of ethical duties by the State to 
protect human rights is subject to a more complex and context-sensitive analysis, that considers 
structural patterns of social injustice and inequality which permeate legal and societal 
institutions, and bolsters positive obligations by the State and the enforcement of socio-
economic rights as linked indissolubly to civil and political rights under a substantive 
egalitarian ethos.73 
2. Vulnerability as transversal concept 
Human vulnerability stems from our embodied existence, which creates a range of needs, 
whilst making us susceptible to different kinds of physical, emotional, or psychological 
harms.74 Harm may stem from different sources ranging from disease and disability to violence, 
poverty, discrimination, financial crisis or environmental disaster, and leads to social exclusion 
and precarious states of deprivation of socio-economic resources, possibly culminating in 
health deterioration and early death.75 It seems intuitive that our human needs combined with 
our natural susceptibility to injury or harm logically entail our dependence on means and on 
societal support to fulfil them (ie resources, relationships and legal and social institutions that 
provide a minimum threshold of security).76 Thus, it is not a stretch to assert that because we 
are vulnerable to others, two ethical obligations ensue in society: on the one hand, the 
obligation not to commit abuse or exploitation by taking advantage of one’s vulnerability; on 
the other, the duty to cater for the needs of others, especially those in situations of severe 
vulnerability who are either suffering unjustifiably grave harms or in danger of facing 
predicaments which derive from deprivation of resources and care.77 Moreover, aggravated 
vulnerability leads to loss of agency, meaning increased dependency. This may prevent 
individuals from leading a thriving life with autonomy, liberty, and freedom, important liberal 
values that are nonetheless subject to different interpretations by virtue of their open-
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endedness. In this context, two salient features of vulnerability stand out as constituting an 
apparent paradox: at one end, its universality and its enduring nature, as all human beings are 
vulnerable to suffering harm; on the other end, a particularity of ways in which individuals 
experience vulnerability, varying in inversely proportionate intensity to the resilience one has 
accumulated throughout life.78 One example of accumulated resilience is a person who has not 
suffered undernourishment and continuously enjoyed health-related resources throughout life, 
becoming a healthy adult. Another illustration is an individual with more educational 
opportunities that as a consequence had an expanded range of work prospects. 
The State, representing organised political society as a moral community, is responsible 
for tackling domination and exploitation and mitigating vulnerability as to avoid grave human 
rights violations. Furthermore, the State also ought to foster resilience and agency to enable 
individuals to thrive and lead meaningful and dignified lives. It is vital to notice that how the 
State fulfils its duty of ensuring human rights is as ethically relevant as bringing about the 
fulfillment itself, in that an egalitarian ethos must be followed. 79  In this sense, unequal 
distribution of resilience-fostering resources must be prevented, to avoid the discriminatory 
allocation of elements which increase the vulnerability of certain individuals, placing a 
disproportionate burden and institutionally ratifying social patterns of privilege and 
disadvantage. 
Adopting as a starting point human rights as ‘ethical claims’ (which entitle individuals 
to a treatment conveying ‘equal respect and concern’ by the State)80 vulnerability might act as 
the conceptual cornerstone of an intellectually appealing human rights theory that displays the 
required ethical sensibility to engage in such a hard endeavour.81 To this end, I argue that the 
capability-based theory is suited to supply theoretical bulkiness to this theoretical human rights 
framework that sits at the intersection of substantive equality and social justice. 
a) Vulnerability and its dual ambivalence 
Vulnerability is a multifaceted phenomenon which shelters inherent conceptual ambivalences. 
If on the one hand, vulnerability exists as a constant and universal condition viscerally inherent 
in human beings, on the other, it can be experienced in particular ways, as some individuals 
have their vulnerability increased while others have theirs mitigated due to the power dynamic 
inserted within social, legal and institutional frameworks.82 The universal/particular dualistic 
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aspects embedded in the notion of vulnerability are dialectically reconcilable. On the one hand, 
universality relates to the universal human condition of dependence on the surrounding 
sociality and materiality required for sustaining human life, a built-in need imbued from birth 
and thus, generally and equally possessed by all individuals. On the other hand, particularity 
refers to the diversity of human experience, in light of the interaction of embodied beings with 
social, legal and other normative institutions that selectively ascribe different values to distinct 
embodied lives, construing social privilege and thereby often corroborating societal structures 
of inequality.83 In this context, specific forms of harm may affect in a disproportionate manner 
certain individuals compared to others who benefit from extant institutional structures and 
norms. 
The negative or positive consequences deriving from vulnerability constitute the second 
indissoluble ambiguity. Vulnerability is intertwined with the body because the latter is not only 
the mouldable surface on which social meanings are inscribed,84 but it is also what allows 
humans to be dependent upon others, susceptible to different forms of harm as well as to 
respond to the world in different ways by feelings of joy, pleasure, suffering, rage, and so forth, 
which derive from the connectedness of social interdependency.85 Although vulnerability is 
undeniably a permanent condition that allows humans to have meaningful relationships and 
develop affection, empathy, intimacy, and care, exacerbated vulnerability deriving from social 
inequality and structural patterns of marginalisation may lead to embodied harms, grave 
suffering, deprivation, and as a result loss of agency and autonomy as well as serious human 
rights violations. Lack of recognition (a flawed perception by society that all lives are equally 
valuable) combined to inequality of resilience-sustaining resources may be seen as foundations 
of selective exacerbated vulnerability.86 What I mean is that social inequalities, exemplified by 
discrimination and poverty, stem both from a perception in its deviant form of misrecognition 
as well as unequal material distribution, and call for the State to address the root causes of these 
issues which might lead to systematic breaches of human rights. 
b) Vulnerability as magnifying ethical lens 
The normative implications arising from vulnerability can be better perceived by 
acknowledging that vulnerable subjects are essentially precarious lives. Vulnerable subjects 
ought to be regarded as precarious lives insofar as life is imbued with fragility and destined 
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ultimately to death, either due to wilful action or fortuitous cause. 87  ‘Precariousness’ is 
therefore the specific vulnerability relating to the frailty of life in light of its inescapable 
ultimate destruction.88 Precariousness may be minimised or maximised according to normative 
and institutional settings in which the embodied existence unravels,89 in that social and political 
forces create normative constructions of the subject entailing different degrees of recognition 
as precarious lives. Individuals hence experience different degrees of precariousness by virtue 
of discrepant levels of societal recognition. If precariousness is perceived differently and 
valued in different subjects, this means that the State does not demonstrate ‘equal respect and 
concern’ for equally precarious lives.90 Recognising equally vulnerable lives as precarious 
implies acknowledging their loss as equally grievable and their sustaining as equally 
worthwhile, which suggests the normative obligation of fostering their ‘persistence and 
flourishing’.91 This is deeply conditioned by availability of social and material resources and 
thus harmed by its unequal distribution. 
Although no reasonable ethical imperative would suggest for instance that the right to 
life entitles to protection against mortality, recognising precariousness as normatively relevant 
is extremely important. Moreover, acknowledging the obligation to minimise vulnerability 
under an egalitarian ethos, while taking into account the need to mitigate differential allocation 
of aggravated forms of vulnerability is of equal importance.92 Reducing precariousness and 
rectifying its arbitrary allocation among embodied beings thus become ethical and normative 
obligations that favour increased societal responsiveness to vulnerability together with a 
conception of human beings as essentially social, relational, and interdependent. In addition to 
that, the ability to exercise freedom and agency cannot be conceived apart from socio-material 
reality, which strengthens the normative stance of socio-economic rights such as ‘food, shelter 
and other conditions for persisting and flourishing’. 93  This endeavour entails addressing 
vulnerability by reformulating social and institutional mechanisms that enable and impact 
modes of thriving, by adopting a notion of State responsiveness that comprises enlarged 
responsibility to implement concrete measures. Taking socio-economic rights seriously 
involves strengthening human rights adjudication to take them into account, broadening the 
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scope of moral duties owed by the State with regard to ‘positive social obligations of food, 
shelter, medical care, education, mobility and expression’.94 
c) Vulnerability, relational autonomy and agency 
Autonomy is often conceived as an erga omnes freedom, a liberty to choose independently, 
free from constraints deriving from intervention by others or the State. 95  By contrast, 
dependency is associated with a devalued notion of caretaking and stigmatised as pertinent 
solely to the private sphere of the family, beyond the acceptability threshold for State 
interference. As a result, embracing these oppositional notions equates, in principle, to refuting 
just entitlements to socio-economic provisions by the State.96 Notwithstanding, vulnerability 
is essentially a relational notion,97 which harnesses the concept of ‘relational autonomy’: a 
different notion of autonomy that harmonises with the reality of dependency.98 In this context, 
relational autonomy is the result of rethinking positive and negative values ascribed to 
autonomy and dependency in liberal theory. 
According to the relational approach, autonomy mainly presupposes the following 
premises. First, eschewal of individualistic approaches to autonomy, such as upholding the 
prevalence of negative liberties and maximising as utmost priority the minimally-constrained 
individual freedom of choice. Second, recognising the indispensable value of social 
interdependency in the development of autonomy-related competencies.99 Autonomy stems 
from a permanent socially-driven process, ie social relationships both allow for its flourishing 
and impose boundaries on its manifestation and subsequent consolidation into one’s individual 
autonomous identity. Hinging on vulnerability as the universal factor enabling one’s 
relationships with others, relational autonomy not only comprises individual capacity, but also 
social status. The status aspect of autonomy is constituted relationally by means of the 
recognition ascribed to the individual in the family, at work, by social and legal institutions and 
by the State. On the contrary, misrecognition negatively impacts self-esteem and self-respect 
and hinders one’s process of developing autonomy-related capacity, thereby compromising 
one’s ability to achieve satisfactory levels of socio-material conditions that allow the exercise 
of autonomy.100 Insidious forms of misrecognition such as historical discrimination may lead 
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not only to the undermining of autonomy but also to intensifying vulnerability to exploitation 
and abuse, creating oppressive patterns of social relationships. 
Not only is it reasonable to assert that vulnerability underpins relational autonomy but 
it can be suggested that a relational approach to autonomy is the central tenet upon which to 
carry out vulnerability-targeted State action. Thus, addressing vulnerability through the lens of 
relational autonomy calls upon the promotion of agency-enabling socio-economic and 
institutional environments in which all vulnerable beings may equally flourish according to 
their particular views of what constitutes a meaningful live. In this context, a simple and 
alluring framework of ethical State duties emerges, involving the duties of mitigating 
vulnerability by countering context-proneness to harm, suffering and loss of agency, as well as 
providing socio-material resources to allow for autonomy-hinged resilience, so as to allow 
individuals to cope with their particular experiences of vulnerability. 
In order to engage in a constructive account of vulnerability and State responsiveness, 
the notion of relational autonomy and a robust egalitarian ethos play important roles. One may 
infer that, by intertwining vulnerability and relational autonomy, the State’s response to 
vulnerability involves an agency-fostering stance that commits to resilience-building action 
with a view to mitigating inherent vulnerabilities. In addition, due to issues of misrecognition 
such as prejudice, discrimination and social exclusion, the State must commit to concomitantly 
reduce the unequal burden placed on disadvantaged individuals due to vulnerabilities resulting 
from social, legal and political normative and institutional inequalities. Therefore, regarding 
the ethical duties of the State, responsibility for protecting and promoting fundamental rights 
under substantive equality becomes salient.101 In this regard, the capabilities theory of rights 
seems suited to chime with vulnerability as a justificatory basis for human rights protection 
and promotion in liberal democracies, providing an account of equality of capabilities as 
substantive equality.102 By the same token, I argue that vulnerability provides a conceptual 
underpinning that supplements the capabilities theory. 
3. Vulnerability, capabilities and freedom 
The capabilities theory posits that individuals exercise substantive freedom by developing 
capabilities to achieve functionings: ie to be self-determined human beings.103 Capabilities are 
hence a measurement of the scope of free choices within a range of possible functionings. Thus, 
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capabilities indicate the extent of choice on what and who to be in the pursuit of a valuable 
life.104 The capabilities theory was developed as a comparator for social justice, in an attempt 
to offer a more sophisticated and complex understanding of human wellbeing and life quality 
than single-metric indicators such as income.105 Pursuant to this theory, ‘basic capabilities’ 
refer to primordial innate characteristics, which may evolve to become ‘internal capabilities’ 
by development of emotional and intellectual skills through external stimuli and interpersonal 
exchanges with the surrounding socio-material environment. ‘Combined capabilities’ consist 
of the measurement of the actual freedoms one possesses, which can be inferred by evaluating 
the entire set of available choices with respect to how to act and build one’s identity under 
surrounding social, economic, legal and political circumstances. 
Capabilities may be regarded as metrics for substantive equality that focus on the width 
of human freedom to choose ‘functionings’ to the extent that they are actually achieved through 
the exercise of human agency under a notion of human development, an essentially dynamic 
and relational process.106 Hence, capabilities reasoning shifts the focus from means to achieve 
functionings (ie material resources), to capabilities that realistically measure the actual 
opportunities available to each individual. In this way, it presents not only a measurement of 
substantive equality but also a more accurate assessment of societal privileges and 
disadvantages.107 
Furthermore, the capability-based approach to human rights is premised upon freedoms 
as descriptive aspects of the human condition, ie distinctive human features from which a 
prescriptive human rights theory may stem.108 The theory further posits that the particular 
freedoms that underlie human rights have to meet two thresholds to be considered as such: the 
significance threshold and the social impact threshold.109 First, these freedoms must attain a 
satisfactory degree of significance in relation to other freedoms, which justifies giving them 
normative priority. Second, these freedoms must meet the social impact threshold (ie their 
capacity to be affected by society whether in the form of curtailment or protection), which 
would justify endowing these freedoms of normative salience by creating human rights as 
ethical claims to protect them. 
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In this context, the capabilities sphere would reflect the scope of freedom one possesses 
regarding one’s actual opportunities. Under this framework, human rights represent ethical 
articulations to ensure that a minimum threshold of fundamental freedoms are equally enjoyed 
by all individuals. Central capabilities may be posited as both essential freedoms and premises 
for a thriving and dignified existence – a threshold level which should be guaranteed to all 
individuals by a moral political community.110 Defining precisely which central capabilities 
might mirror fundamental freedoms and corresponding human rights might be contentious. 
Nevertheless, the general idea that capabilities are crucial for ensuring agency in the form of 
relational autonomy emphasises the important role of socio-material conditions and social 
relationships. In this sense, it is reasonable to suggest that ensuring a threshold level of central 
capabilities for all persons is not only an ethical duty of the State, but also a prerequisite for 
guaranteeing coherence within a human rights-respecting culture. 
It is noteworthy that the notion of vulnerability begs for an egalitarian ethos to be 
applied in relation to its sources. In this sense, equality is an important principle to bear in mind 
when suggesting the attenuation of vulnerability that is worsened by structural problems such 
as misrecognition or mal-distribution. These vulnerability-aggravating issues underscore how 
actual opportunities and freedoms might be encumbered by social inequalities, ultimately 
leading to disregard of such freedoms and corresponding human rights violations. 
Given this overview, I argue that the convergences between vulnerability and capability 
theories stem from their common understanding of human beings as subjects who build 
resilience over time, in a context-sensitive approach that rejects the understanding of the liberal 
legal subject as a priori invulnerable. It follows that both of these theories endorse eschewing 
the simplistic idea that finding human rights violations is merely capturing one situational 
frame in time and disregarding the broader context and structural elements. As a result, both 
vulnerability and capabilities theories tip the scales in favour of a context-sensitive approach 
to human rights interpretation.111 
I further argue that vulnerability supplements the capabilities approach to human rights. 
First, vulnerability offers a more convincing conceptual grounding to the foundational 
universality that underlies human rights theory. In line with a consequence-based approach, 
Amartya Sen posits that the universality of human rights is justified by the widespread 
acceptability of human rights discourse across the globe, which supposedly points to its 
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universal character. Under this reasoning, resistance to uncurbed democratic debates involving 
divergent viewpoints is pinpointed as evidence of universality. 112 Conversely, I argue that 
vulnerability consists in a more compelling conceptual basis to the universality of human 
rights. The vulnerability theory places focus on an undeniable truth about human nature: our 
inevitably shared material embodiment.113 Rather than focusing on how the idea has managed 
to resist through time and across different geographical locations, vulnerability is better-suited 
to justify universality insofar as its underlying rationale is both understandable by emotional 
empathy as well as intelligible by sensible rationality. 
Second, Sen advocates for human rights duties as reasons for action that do not require 
a high threshold of concreteness, ie duties that may plausibly be less concrete than performing 
a specific action. His theory submits that these duties might consist in a more vaguely 
circumscribed responsibility to take sensible steps to address the situation. This would entail 
either avoiding or redressing the human rights breach, whilst assessing other relevant priorities 
which may vary from case to case.114 The high level of abstractness of these obligations may 
be contended as an argument against them, as it would place a burden on the duty-bearer; 
nonetheless, endowing State duties with more concreteness might be attained through human 
rights practice, for example context-sensitive interpretation by human rights courts through 
heuristics such as vulnerability. This position disputes the argument that the alleged 
indeterminacy of socio-economic rights and correlated duties weakens their legalisation and 
justiciability,115 which is convergent with the human rights courts’ practice on vulnerability. 
State duties with respect to socio-economic rights and positive obligations might not be as 
straightforward as those corresponding to civil and political rights and negative obligations of 
non-interference. Nevertheless, the mere acknowledgment of an ethical imperative calling for 
State responsibility to actively respond to vulnerability and human rights, is an important step 
towards strengthening the ethical and juridical framework for State accountability. In this 
sense, State responsiveness should generally address the necessity of an equal minimum 
threshold of material opportunities in a capability-developing environment for all individuals. 
Sen also acknowledges that human rights duties may arise regardless of any causality 
from the duty-bearer’s past action regarding the rights infringement, focusing rather on the 
potentiality of the duty-bearer’s future action to effectively contribute to the protection of 
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human rights.116 This ethical starting point of duty-ascertainment in relation to human rights 
chimes with the call for State responsiveness to address human vulnerability, as the 
responsibility-assignment shifts from those who have provoked harm to those who are in a 
position to effectively prevent or redress it. In the case of human rights violations where 
ascribing individual responsibility is a hard task (for example cases involving social injustices 
such as misrecognition and maldistribution whose responsibility is diluted within the social 
corpus), the State is advantageously positioned to carry out positive interventions. 
4. State responsiveness to vulnerability  
Given the capability and vulnerability-underpinned framework, the ethical framework of State 
responsibility to human rights is enhanced in two ways. First, this framework favours a more 
holistic approach to human rights interpretation by blurring the divide between civil and 
political, and socio-economic rights. In this way, it bolsters the idea of all human rights as 
intrinsically interdependent insofar as it evidences the fact that one’s liberties, freedoms and 
even the right to life cannot be separated from one’s ability to enjoy social and economic 
conditions to survive and thrive. Developing capabilities and achieving meaningful 
functionings (ie having one’s vulnerability mitigated and one’s agency fostered), necessarily 
require that a threshold of socio-economic rights is guaranteed. Second, this framework 
encourages the inclusion of positive obligations in the State sphere of human rights duties by 
guiding the State’s efforts towards beneficial non-paternalistic intervention, disrupting the 
private/public divide and effectively responding to the unequal distribution of vulnerability and 
resilience factors dictated by the pace of social inequalities and injustices. 
Acknowledging the dual ambivalence of the concept of vulnerability means exploring 
a non-libertarian notion of agency, freedom and autonomy as congruent with dependency and 
care. Contrary to notions of group vulnerability which ascribe them the negative connotations 
of victimhood, passivity and pathology, an ethics of vulnerability paves the way for a more 
accurate depiction of human nature in its vulnerable ambivalence. As a consequence, it 
enhances the delimitation of the State duty to respond to the needs of human vulnerability and 
fostering agency as relational autonomy, whilst avoiding the pitfalls of a simplistic notion of 
vulnerability that leads either to paternalistic or coercive interventions.117 
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D. STATE RESPONSES TO VULNERABILITY: HUMAN RIGHTS DUTIES 
With the aim of building a strong theoretical framework of human rights obligations by the 
State, two justificatory theories will be set forth as starting point. An evaluation will follow on 
the pitfalls to be avoided and the duties to be comprised by this framework. Finally, I will 
conclude with a critical assessment of the concept of vulnerability as adopted by the European 
and the Inter-American human rights courts. 
1. Ethical Justifications 
a) Convergences of an ethics of vulnerability and an ethics of needs 
An ethics of needs supports a justification that a perception of vulnerability is intimately 
connected with the emergence of correlated State duties.118 The justification of this ethics of 
needs is two-pronged. First, vulnerability is associated to its negative aspect of susceptibility 
to harm. In order to prevent the occurrence of harm, a moral obligation arises of protecting 
individuals from such threats by attending to their basic needs. Second, vulnerability derives 
from human nature and hence gives rise to fundamental needs. These fundamental needs 
consist in the source of the moral obligation to care, provided that the reality of interdependency 
logically entails that these needs cannot be fulfilled without having others to cater for them. 
Catering for one’s needs through an anti-paternalistic standpoint may be conceptualised as 
‘dignifying care’, having as central aim to restore one’s agency by supporting the achievement 
of the person’s ‘self-determined ends’.119  This ethical starting point provides guidance in 
prescribing the scope of moral obligations owed by the State in addressing vulnerability, 
highlighting the fundamental importance of the duty to care with the ultimate purpose of 
restoring and advancing agency. This chimes with the proposition of a vulnerability-mitigating 
and resilience-building State duty, under a relational notion of autonomy that duly accounts for 
the reality of dependency, while considering that accumulation of resilience varies according 
to particular experiences of vulnerability that shape societal recognition and individual capacity 
to exercise agency. 
b) Vulnerability-triggered empathy 
Mitigating vulnerability to tackle the negative effects of its aggravation in particular cases must 
be carried out concomitantly with the commitment to foster its positive effects of inclusion in 
a community and in social, institutional and legal networks. The ethical blueprint of this 
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reasoning is to annihilate unfair entrenched social inequalities and promote human agency 
under an egalitarian ethos that fosters equal concern and protection for all human lives. The 
normative concern of tackling and preventing vulnerability-deriving harms surfaces insofar as 
vulnerability also allows us to refine human sensitivity in the form of empathy. In this way, we 
are able to build the conviction that it is ethically unacceptable that individuals, whose 
particular experience of aggravated vulnerability is owed to social inequalities, suffer extreme 
disadvantages, loss of agency and deprivation of necessary resources to fulfil essential needs. 
It is argued that the essential moral core of the human rights discourse lies in the need 
to recognise other human beings as equally worthy and deserving not only of respect and 
concern but also care.120 Simply bringing up vulnerability and asking one to reflect upon it 
invites an automatic reaction. The invitation elicits the memory of a person in a vulnerable state 
whose agency cannot be restored independently from other people, urgently demanding 
remedial action. If someone living in Europe were to think about a vulnerable person, his mind 
would plausibly call forth the image of a refugee, asylum-seeker, or a member of the Roma 
minority; if a person living in Latin America were given the same task, his memory would 
possibly elicit the image of a member of a land-dispossessed indigenous tribe or a poor 
homeless person living in the streets. The feeling of empathy and apprehension of moral 
wrongness emerging in both cases can be inferred as similar and constituting, intuitively and 
rationally, a reason for societal or State action. One must nonetheless be wary of this 
hypothetical illustration. Different vulnerability-aggravating factors contribute to the creation 
of distinct particularly vulnerable groups across the globe. Notwithstanding the stigma that the 
very acknowledgment of certain groups as vulnerable creates, the identification of sources 
increasing the vulnerability of certain individuals in particular contexts is useful as far as it 
points to patterns of increased vulnerability and possibly human rights breaches. In this sense, 
it contributes to identity politics and human rights activism in different regions. 
In this context, I argue that the positive aspect of vulnerability, relating to human 
connectedness and the ability to build meaningful relationships, enables the triggering of 
empathy. This contributes not only to an intelligible call for action but also to a compelling 
normative claim for mitigating the harm-enabling aspect of vulnerability, particularly in 
situations that may result in grave human rights violation. This justificatory reason for 
responding to vulnerability has as underlying rationale: the combination of compassionate 
feeling of indignation with rational reprehension of the fact that there exists a structurally-
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endorsed breach in the core human value of equality. Due to our acknowledgment of 
vulnerability and precariousness to the socio-materiality around us, we can relate, 
empathetically, to the predicament of those who have their vulnerability unfairly increased and 
their agency compromised, being more susceptible to facing exploitation and abuse (for 
example being enslaved in the context of extreme economic vulnerability amounting to poverty 
and deprivation, suffering physical violence due to the vulnerable status of being a member of 
a historically-discriminated group, suffering domestic violence due to economic and social 
vulnerabilities arising from a gender-oppressive environment). These situations characterise 
paradigmatic cases of human rights violations through the lens of vulnerability. If the State has 
a moral duty to take human rights seriously by providing equal concern to individuals, 
preventing and protecting particularly vulnerable individuals from harm and structural patterns 
of oppression is of utmost importance. This entails mitigating vulnerability by providing care 
and fostering agency, as well as tackling the unequal allocation of vulnerability by remedying 
pre-existing inequalities of opportunities. 
2. State responsibility for the human rights of the vulnerable subject 
In light of the vulnerability-based justifications for State responsibility, I argue that 
vulnerability shores up the idea of a universal condition shared by humanity and serves as 
conceptual underpinning for a more robust analysis of State duties. Furthermore, refining the 
notion of the liberal subject in law through the ‘vulnerable subject’ notion sheds an alluring 
light onto human rights interpretation, by endowing theory with a more realistic apprehension 
of the human being than the archetypical legal subject.121 
a) Avoiding paternalistic and coercive State Interventions 
The notion of vulnerability put forward in this paper brings to the fore a more complex and 
holistic perspective on human beings, human rights, and State duties, hence rejecting the 
traditional notion of vulnerability, which merely categorises individuals and groups. Thus, it is 
necessary to be wary and not fall prey of the pitfall of adopting vulnerability as a stigmatising 
label, which ends up justifying paternalistic interferences by the State. By paternalism I mean 
a ‘pathogenic source of vulnerability’, 122  namely State action that aggravates pre-existing 
vulnerabilities through governmental interventions which fail to recognise vulnerable 
individuals as autonomous agents and neglect to prioritize the goal of fostering their autonomy, 
focusing instead on minimising risks to society. Paternalistic interferences categorise 
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individuals and restrict them rather than promoting their autonomy, circumscribing them in a 
category of incompetence or deviance which further contributes to their marginalisation.123 
Moreover, paternalistic policy-makers do not take into account the views of vulnerable 
individuals either in formulating or implementing State interventions. This exclusionary logic 
is hidden behind the inadequacy and failure of institutions to reduce vulnerabilities and help 
create security, perpetuating patterns of inequality instead. This creates a vulnerability-
aggravating mechanism of institutional precariousness. 124  Hence, to avoid the pitfall of 
creating paternalistic State practices to human rights and vulnerabilities, an agency-fostering 
State under the notion of relational autonomy must be fostered at all times, recognising the 
reality of social interdependency. 
b) Uncovering socio-economic rights and positive obligations 
Enhancing socio-economic rights and corresponding State duties as well as positive obligations 
by the State, involves ensuring that social conditions and resources allow for substantive 
equality with respect to access and opportunities, rejecting the libertarian notion of the ideal 
State as ‘noninterventionist, antiregulatory and minimal’.125 Although it is crucial to recognise 
that ‘inherent vulnerabilities’, such as those stemming from factors like age and disability, 
cannot be entirely remedied, ‘situational vulnerabilities’ that are context-specific sources that 
increase vulnerability (eg environmental or financial crises) trigger the State duty to engage in 
the necessary measures to stop their nefarious effects.126 Among ‘situational vulnerabilities’, 
‘pathogenic vulnerabilities’ constitute the most morally deplorable and pressing ones, 
characterised as socially created vulnerability-aggravating mechanisms either in the private 
sphere of interpersonal relationships, or in the public sphere of legal and political institutions 
that explicitly or implicitly condone systematic patterns of oppression and social domination. 
Addressing pathogenic vulnerabilities calls for remedying underlying inequalities that remain 
structurally hidden, bolstering substantive equality that is essential for the concrete attainment 
of ethical State goals. 
Presently, the most fundamental of these ethical goals are translated into human rights 
law, hinging on the liberal private/public divide. This watertight private/public division is 
disrupted by the apprehension of vulnerability and social interdependency, triggering an ethics 
of care that impacts directly the ascription of State duties as more than negative obligations not 
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to intervene in the private sphere, but rather to rectify unequal allocation of social burdens 
deriving from societal misrecognition and mal-distribution. This additional duty may be 
fulfilled through agency-fostering positive measures of allocating available resources that help 
individuals who suffer unfair disadvantages to recover their agency by accumulating resilience. 
In this sense, defending positive obligations necessarily requires revisiting the private/public 
divide. The idea that the State should keep away from private relationships disregards the fact 
that abusive and exploitative relationships take place in private interpersonal relationships,127 
which may hide oppression and grave human rights violations. Hence, human rights cannot be 
effectively protected by erecting a wall hindering the State from interfering with one’s private 
sphere. The libertarian claim for a noninterventionist State presents a major flaw insofar as it 
conflates the State’s oppressive encroachment upon individual rights with the State’s 
constructive engagement in ensuring minimal security to all individuals by tackling harmful 
consequences from their equally permanent, though differently felt, human vulnerability. 
On the one hand, providing social and economic rights such as welfare is an expression 
of the duty to care, meeting the basic human needs of those who face exacerbated vulnerability 
and precariousness in order to ensure their survivability and to prevent them from deprivation, 
thereby protecting them from serious human rights infringements. On the other hand, positive 
duties of the State to foster recognition, such as affirmative action, and to redistribute resources, 
such as redistributive taxation, may provide a substantive equality framework that corrects 
grave structural injustices and promotes an agency-fostering culture. 128  This framework 
encourages the State to treat all individuals under its jurisdiction with equal concern and care. 
Furthermore, it also leads the State to mitigate inequalities and remedy social disadvantages, 
in consonance with social justice. Mindful of that, I argue that the strong State commitment to 
addressing vulnerability is not only desirable as a matter of social justice but it also constitutes 
a moral duty to implement the respect, protection and promotion of human rights under an 
ethics of vulnerability. 
3. Vulnerability in the practice of human rights courts 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR) have developed interesting case law premised upon the adoption of group 
vulnerability as heuristic device. Despite being contextually inserted within different cultural 
scenarios and thereby facing distinct factual and legal issues, both courts share key structural 
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characteristics and commonalities which invite the joint critical assessment of their 
jurisprudence. 
Hinging on the notion of vulnerability, Contracting States in the Inter-American system 
have entered into a wide array of special treaties and conventions, and issued declarations 
targeting vulnerable groups, broadening and specifying the jurisdictional scope of the IACtHR 
(regarding, for example, women, children, indigenous peoples, peoples with disabilities, sexual 
orientation and gender identity, nationality, asylum, refuge and internally displaced persons, 
and families of victims of enforced disappearances). Furthermore, an implicit argument of 
vulnerability can be highlighted in the reasoning of the IACtHR’s decisions, characterised as 
contextual and relational, as well as targeted at identifying and transforming situations of 
vulnerability that exist because of structural inequalities. 129  To illustrate, in Yakye Axa 
Indigenous Community v Paraguay,130 the IACtHR found violations of the rights to property, 
access to court and right to life of the Yakye Axa indigenous community, acknowledging that 
it dealt with a high-risk vulnerable group and setting the State’s positive obligation to ensure a 
dignified life for its members, guaranteeing the protection of civil as well as of socio-economic 
rights, pursuant to the San Salvador Protocol.131 
Despite considerable progress carried out by the IACtHR, greater doctrinal 
sophistication on the topic of discrimination and vulnerable groups has found its breeding 
ground in the European context, particularly in the case law of the ECtHR.132 According to 
recent doctrine, vulnerability is used both as a descriptive and prescriptive tool in legal 
reasoning and interpretation.133 Academics have revealed a tendency in the ECtHR to enhance 
its use of nondiscrimination standards through the conceptual evolution of equality from formal 
to substantive equality, asserting that neutral-based rules might have a ‘disproportionately 
burdening effect on vulnerable social groups’.134 It is further argued that the ECtHR has been 
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responsive to the issue of indirect discrimination by setting forth a notion of substantive 
equality and socio-economic rights.135 
As illustration, in MSS v Belgium and Greece,136 the ECtHR recognised the particular 
vulnerability of an asylum-seeker from Afghanistan who had endured terrible predicaments 
while migrating, being detained and subsequently living in the streets. The decision emphasised 
the State’s inaction against the conspicuous deprivation of essential needs of MSS, mirrored in 
socio-economic rights, and the vulnerable status of the applicant. The Court finally decided to 
hold the State accountable for violating the applicant’s human rights under Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture as well as cruel and inhumane 
treatment. Inferring socio-economic rights (and corresponding duties) from the civil right of 
freedom from torture, and boosting positive obligations from the State, are important 
enhancements in human rights interpretation which, in this case, may be attributed to the 
adoption of vulnerability as heuristic device. 137  Notwithstanding, the Court has not given 
proper normative relevance to vulnerability in all cases involving individuals whose 
vulnerability was particularly high. In the case of N v UK,138 for instance, the Court decided 
that removing a Ugandan HIV-positive woman back to her home country after her asylum 
application had been denied did not amount to cruel and inhumane treatment or torture. The 
decision disregarded considerations about the vulnerability of the applicant – which only 
appeared in dissenting opinions – and highlighted her medically-induced stable condition, in 
stark contrast to the vulnerability assessment carried out in MSS. In the Court’s analysis, the 
applicant’s embodied vulnerability was dissociated from the contextual intricacies with respect 
to her medication-dependent health, soon to deteriorate without appropriate healthcare. The 
likelihood of government-induced oppression in her home country was also ignored as a 
vulnerability-aggravating factor.139 
In addition to the coherence flaws pointed out in the case law, it is important to note 
that the ECtHR did not entirely embrace the concept of vulnerable subject as per vulnerability 
theory,140 and the same applies to the IACtHR. Both courts generally look at vulnerable groups 
instead of acknowledging vulnerable individuals. Rather than eschewing the archetypical legal 
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subject and positing the universality and constancy of vulnerability, the adoption of group 
vulnerability still falls into the pitfall of labelling only certain groups as vulnerable. This leaves 
room for perpetuating the stigmatising prejudice that those who are part of these groups lack 
agency and are incapable of catering for their own needs, whereas those who are not are, on 
the contrary, fully-fledged liberal agents capable of making their own choices. As a result, 
vulnerability is not fully applied and individuals who are not part of reified groups might end 
up excluded from having their vulnerability recognised and taken into due account. 
Thus, owing to lack of conceptual stringency in the adoption of vulnerability, there still 
seems to be room for its conflation with the traditional notion of vulnerability. This notion is 
undesirable as it allows for paternalistic interventions which do not envisage agency-fostering 
decisions. It is reasonable to conclude that this challenge is yet to be overcome. 
Notwithstanding, the Courts’ acknowledgment of vulnerability as heuristic device has already 
marked a starting point to a more context-sensitive assessment of human rights violations and 
to a more holistic understanding of interdependent human rights,141 transcending positivistic 
readings of rights in the conventions to a complex interpretation that draws socio-economic 
rights from civil and political rights. 
In this context, paving the way for conceptual soundness and theoretical coherence by 
undertaking a capabilities and vulnerability-underpinned approach to human rights seems to 
constructively supplement the current practice, providing the tools to shore up systematic 
decisions to enhance the framework of State duties regarding human rights. The State has a 
responsibility for ensuring a minimum threshold of social and economic conditions for all. 
Moreover, it must recognize aggravated vulnerability and precarious agency-undermining 
contexts whilst avoiding categorising groups. A theoretically sound framework for State duties 
would avoid incoherent and inconsistent decision-making, settling conclusively that States 
have the ethical and normative obligation to avoid and redress human rights violations, which 
encompasses fostering agency and mitigating vulnerability. This is of special concern in cases 
of individuals whose vulnerability is particularly aggravated by deep-seated social injustice 
(for example prejudice, violence and deprivation) which has hindered resilience-accumulation 
and development of capabilities to achieve meaningful functioning and live autonomous lives. 
4. Rethinking human rights interpretation 
In contrast with traditional modes of liberal interpretation, I argue that human rights guided by 
vulnerability and the capabilities doctrines is premised upon a more refined notion of 
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substantive equality, and conducts the legal rationale to a context-sensitive interpretation which 
brings to the fore structural power dynamics of subordination and domination, and oppressive 
backgrounds against which many human rights violations occur. Adopting this theoretical 
framework could provide valuable guidance for human rights decisions that show genuine 
commitment to universal human rights as ethical claims based on our shared vulnerability. Two 
practical results ensue. On the one hand, the divide between civil and political versus socio-
economic rights is ruptured and the justiciability of socio-economic rights by the State becomes 
not only plausible but also a strong ethical imperative to ensure the coherent application of 
human rights.142 On the other hand, the State’s sphere of positive obligations is widened.143 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
Under the aegis of substantive equality, State responsibility is called upon when individuals 
are found in situations of intense precariousness, either facing or in risk of facing grave harm. 
Mitigating vulnerability and fostering agency and resilience are required especially when this 
precariousness stems from structural power inequalities that have led to politically-induced, 
socio-material disadvantage. This rationale challenges claims that individuals are personally 
responsible for their socio-economic wellbeing and should endure the consequences of the 
formally equal meritocratic logic even when it entails deprivation of functioning-enabling 
resources and consequent susceptibility to serious kinds of capability-curtailing and life-
threatening harms. By means of a vulnerability analysis, human rights violations and the rise 
of State responsibility are not primarily assessed by merit or causality, but rather by identifying 
a pressing need that triggers States responsiveness as an imperative for justice, a rationale that 
can be comprehended both intellectually as well as empathetically, harmonising reason and 
emotion. 
Vulnerability allows for the reconcilement of the apparently paradoxical dualisms of 
universality versus particularity and public versus private. Moreover, under a capabilities and 
vulnerability-underpinned approach, I suggest that yet another binary is disrupted: the clear-
cut division of civil and political rights versus economic and social rights. Surpassing the 
strictness of Cartesian binaries and static analysis allows us to get a glimpse at the potentially 
disruptive nature of vulnerability in traditional legal thinking. Vulnerability analysis is an 
interesting attempt to overcome these challenges by implying context-sensitive interpretation 
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to human rights, focusing on the dynamic interplay formed by vulnerable subjects, their needs 
and the correlated ethical demands within contingent situations. Furthermore, vulnerability is 
an alternative theoretical response to enhance human rights interpretation, paving the way for 
enhanced institutional responses of law and politics to current human rights challenges 
concerning inequality, disadvantage and oppression.
